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The Absolute Priority Doctrine in
Corporate Reorganizations
Walter J. Blum and Stanley A. Kaplant

The absolute or strict priority doctrine in corporate reorganizations
under the Bankruptcy Act' has never been comfortable for practitioners
or theorists to live with.2 Almost as soon as the courts articulated this
standard of fairness, it was subjected to attack. Over the years, dissatisfaction has grown and proposals for modification have accumulated.
The recent Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws had little difficulty in
locating uneasiness over the doctrine and in turning up suggested
modifications. 8 Even the specific changes recommended by the Cort Professors

of Law, The University of Chicago.

1 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 1 et seq., 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended 11 U.S.C. §§ 1

et seq. (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text and notes as Bankruptcy Act].
2 No attempt is made in this article to restate the case for the absolute priority doctrine. That case has been amply developed in court decisions, see Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312
U.S. 510 (1941); Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318
U.S. 523 (1943), and in the literature, see Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in
Corporate Reorganizations:A Reappraisal,25 U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1958); Frye, The "Fair
and Equitable Doctrine": Are Liquidation Rights a Realistic Standard During Corporate
Reorganization?,20 CATHOLC U.L. REv. 394 (1971); Gardner, The SEC and Valuation Under Chapter X, 91 U. PA. L. REv. 440 (1943); Note, Strict Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 49 YALE L.J. 1099 (1940).
3 The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was established by
the Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (reproduced in textual note
preceding 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)), and it filed reports with Congress on July 31, 1973 (Part 1)
and on August 6, 1973 (Part II).
This article does not deal with any aspects of the commission's report except the
recommendations relating to the absolute priority doctrine. The judgments expressed
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mission were not entirely novel. Despite the fact that discussion of the
doctrine has been ongoing, the framing of the issues in controversy has
generally been troublesome.
The difficulty in putting the issues is largely traceable to two factors.
One is that the development of the doctrine, which originated in
equity receivership reorganizations, was influenced by the peculiar
architecture of the Bankruptcy Act. Absolute priority was decreed by
courts to be the proper doctrine for adjusting rights of shareholders
and creditors under section 774 and Chapter X5 (as well as old sections
740 and 77B7). There was little specific consideration of situations
involving corporate financial distress to which the doctrine was best
suited. Absolute priority came to run with classification of the proceedings: in principle, the doctrine was applied to all Chapter X cases, but
not to Chapter X18 cases. Because selection of the governing standard
of fairness depended upon a decision on the appropriate procedural
framework for dealing with the enterprise in distress, argument over
the choice between Chapter X or Chapter XI was, among other things,
an argument over the standard of adjusting rights. In this setting there
was little inducement to articulate principles for determining with precision the proper scope for the absolute priority doctrine, apart from
those fixed by the general reach of Chapter X and section 77.
The other major difficulty in firming up the issues concerns the nature of the doctrine itself. In a sense, the absolute priority doctrine does
prescribe a general rule: before a class of investors can participate in a
reorganization, all more senior classes must be compensated in full for
their claims, measured on the basis of their priorities upon involuntary
liquidation, unless the junior class contributes to the reorganized enterprise something that is reasonably compensatory and is measurable.
Reorganizers have always understood, however, that this general formuin this article apply whether or not one accepts the commission's proposal to combine

Chapters X and XI into a unified framework or its proposal to eliminate the reorganization functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and turn them over
to a new bankruptcy agency. No views are expressed in this article concerning the
proposed agency or the elimination of the SEC's reorganization functions.
4 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text and notes as section 77].
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text and notes as Chapter

X1.
6 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 74, as added by Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 1,
47 Stat. 1467, transferred and incorporatedas parts of Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 by
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840.
7 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 77B, as added by Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 1, 48
Stat. 912, transferred and incorporated as parts of Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 by Act
of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840.
8 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-749 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text and notes as Chapter

Xir.
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lation does not dictate a specific pattern of adjusting rights among
classes of investors. Reorganization plans are the result of a process in
which representatives of the investors "negotiate" (indirectly and sometimes directly) with each other, with the reorganization trustee, sometimes with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or occasionally even with the reorganization judge. The function of the absolute priority doctrine has in essence been to set guidelines for carrying
on these negotiations, largely by validating or invalidating certain lines
of argument and by fixing boundary marks upon the areas within which
negotiation is allowable. For example: it is permissible to argue that a
given junior class has a right to participate in the reorganized company
because a proper valuation of the enterprise leaves an equity for that
class; it is impermissible to argue that a junior class should be allowed
to participate merely in order to forestall the efforts of that class to
prolong the proceedings. The absolute priority doctrine can be characterized as a way of structuring negotiations so that they are sufficiently
disciplined to be held within permissible areas and to permit judicial
review. 9
This perspective on the doctrine helps to explain why so many
questions of fairness remain unresolved. It may also explain why any
proposal to relax the hold of the absolute priority doctrine might be
seen as an attack on the doctrine itself. Since the doctrine is really a
loose mold for controlling negotiations, it is understandably taken in
some quarters as a symbol of the position that any plan of adjusting
rights must be so structured that it is governable by courts. Any inroad
on the doctrine is then thought of as permitting a type of leeway in
plans of reorganization that can defy governance. History supports this
concern. The courts first read the doctrine into the statute in order to
prevent recurrence of ineffectual reorganization adjustments under
which inordinate prices were paid to avert threatened delays, nuisance
claims, and occasional "sweetheart" allocations to juniors.' 0 The fear is
9 See Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Cm. L. REv.
565 (1950); Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock Modifications, 26 RuTrams L. REv. 445 (1973). The importance of such a structure and frame of

reference is indicated by the nonstructured and seemingly almost nonreviewable results
in comparable nonbankruptcy recapitalizations, in which allocations between classes of
shareholders appear to be made and even approved by the courts without any articulated
rationale (unless the implicit standard is "whatever the traffic will bear"). See, e.g.,
Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 809 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962); Goldman v. Postal Tel.,

Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943). For a reprint of a portion of a valuation report by
investment bankers, taken from the record on appeal in the Green Giant case, see W.
BLUM & S. KAPLAN, MATERIALS ON REORGANIZATION, REc.rrALITTiON AND INSOLVENCY
28-31 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BLUTm & KAPLAN].
10 See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co.,

308 U.S. 106 (1939), reprinted in BLUM & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 390-91:
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that a back track from the absoluteness of strict priority will make it
easier for reorganization courts to approve deals under an illusory
"rule" that permits unjustifiable allocation of securities while precluding effective complaint by an objecting member of a senior class.

By way of background to a discussion of the attacks on the doctrine
it is well to recall that reorganizations under Chapter X (and under its
predecessor section 77B, as well as earlier equity receiverships and foreclosure proceedings) involve some of the law's most difficult problems of
analysis, adjustment of rights, and litigation. In the case of a large
industrial enterprise, a not atypical plan of reorganization might have
to deal with the competing claims of: general trade creditors; institutional lenders; factors who had advanced money against accounts receivable; mortgage bond holders (sometimes with paramount liens
against different properties that may be essential to each other and
sometimes with several liens of graded priorities against the same
property); unsecured debenture holders (whose claims may be subordinate to other kinds of unsecured debt); and various preferred and common shareholders.
The early railroad reorganizations, predating the landmark case of
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd," might have tolerated resolution
of the problems in either of two ways. The first approach involved a
general scaling down of various competing claims of creditors and
equity investors through relative reduction of their claims. The second
approach involved allocating all or substantially all of the value of the
enterprise to the top level or levels of creditors and also allowing a
share to any class of equity investors that might be in a position to
provide a special future benefit or might be able to obstruct or delay
consummation of the reorganization. The first procedure was commonly
followed in railroad and industrial reorganizations.1 2 The second proYet fixed charges, top-heavy debts, and complicated structures have persisted in
corporate reorganizations. This has frequently been due to a failure properly to
apply the absolute priority rule. Instead of eliminating valueless claims, a participation has been allotted to al existing securities holders ....
Frequently companies
have emerged from reorganization with more burdensome debt charges and more
complicated capital structures than they had at the beginning of the proceedings.
The usual result is an early return to the reorganization fold.

Economic disadvantages also flow from the issuance of valueless securities in
reorganization, securities which reflect neither existing value nor the payment of a

fresh contribution by junior interests. It

is patently undesirable to place upon

the market securities which represent little more than the paper upon which they
are written. Such valueless securities create the risk of fraud upon future purchasers,
and are peculiarly susceptible to use as media for market manipulations....

11 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
12 The weight 'which pressed for approval of the plan and confirmation of the

sale would be overbearing. Inevitably this machinery of reviewing plans could not
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cedure was typical of the real estate mortgage foreclosure reorganizations of the late 1920s and early 1930s. In those proceedings, first
mortgage bond holders, having bought the property at a foreclosure sale
for less than the total principal amount of the outstanding first mortgage bonds, would allocate a portion of the new corporation (customarily 10 percent) to the equity in order to obviate possible redemption
in states where a right of redemption still existed.' 3
The Boyd case was generally understood to require that a class of
juniors could not participate in the reorganized corporation (absent a
contribution of new value) if a more senior class of claimants lacked
proper participation. In 1939 the Supreme Court held in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co. 14 that the Boyd doctrine was mandatory
in section 77B proceedings (the predecessor of Chapter X). That decision necessarily implied that: (1) the value of the debtor's property and
business first had to be ascertained; (2) the classes of claimants had to
be arranged in proper order of priority, so that participation in the reorganized enterprise could be distributed to claimants in descending
order of priority; and (3) all claimants below the level of available reorganization value would be excluded from participation in the reorganized enterprise.
II
The leading basis for attack upon the strict priority doctrine is that
its premise of a valid and reliable valuation is specious or inflexible or
illusory. In order to distribute the value of an enterprise among the
various claimants, it is first necessary to fix the precise dollar value as
afford full protection to investors, and it served a purpose chiefly insofar as it
"reasonably
domesticated" the Boyd case in the interests of reorganizers....

...

]he inescapable conclusion [is] that within the'vaguely defined bounds of

fairness, the courts permitted reorganizers in federal equity receiverships, mostly

concerned with the larger industrial and railroad reorganizations, to move almost
unchecked in deciding the apportionment of securities in the reorganized enterprise.

Generally, if the order of priorities was roughly preserved, and recognized by at

least marginal differences in amounts allocated, the courts were not further concerned with the details of the plan.
SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcTIvrIEs, PERSONNEL AND
FuNcrIoNs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES pt. VIII, at 51, 58 (1940)

[hereinafter cited as 1940

REPORT].

It should be noted that much of the doctrine concerning absolute priority was
developed in railroad reorganizations, though its most recent development has come
from Chapter X cases. The justification for applying the absolute priority doctrine to
railroad reorganizations is equally applicable to other reorganizations in bankruptcy.
It should be remarked that, in the railroad reorganization field, the distinction between
Chapters X and XI is loosely analogous to the division of functions between sections
77 and 20A.
14 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
Is
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of a given time. The usual valuation process involves making a projection of earnings (based upon past performance, foreseeable capital
needs, and estimated revenues and costs) and then capitalizing earnings
at an appropriate rate. Capitalization establishes the relationship between projected earnings and total present value. That value can be
viewed as being 100 percent, and a level earnings stream can then be
taken as a percentage of that total. For example, if the annual earnings
of the business are deemed to constitute 20 percent of its worth, the
earnings would be said to be capitalized at a 20 percent rate or on a five
times earnings basis.
The relationship between total present value and estimated earnings
is necessarily a matter of judgment. Some guidance may be found in
comparisons with rules of thumb frequently used in the valuation of
businesses and in the price-earnings ratios of securities traded in the
public market. These determinations entail many uncertainties, assumptions, and conjectures. Any choice of capitalization rate necessarily
involves many judgments concerning hazards, business stability, and
future developments. It is difficult to adduce convincing "proof" to
justify applying, say, a 5 percent rather than a 6 percent capitalization
rate-or vice versa. Nevertheless, a 5 percent capitalization rate could
result in a total value that would include a particular class of creditors
as participants in the reorganization plan, whereas a 6 percent rate
would result in a lower value that could exclude those creditors.
The valuation procedure always produces a dollars and cents figure.
Although that figure looks mathematically exact, it actually reflects in a
single number a whole series of highly conjectural and even speculative
judgments concerning long-range business expectations and hazards as
well as future social and general economic conditions. To exclude a
class of creditors or investors from participation in a reorganization
plan based upon so illusory a figure is criticized as capricious. The
process is said to deceive by treating "soft" information as if it were
"hard" and by cloaking predictions in the guise of mathematical certainty, under circumstances where consequences are drastic and final.
Dependency of the valuation process upon the future outlook as of a
particular moment adds to this dissatisfaction. The resultant value figure
is inextricably related to the then accepted set of expectations and
assumptions. If the situation improves shortly after the'reorganization
proceedings have been terminated (so that the risk factor used in determining valuation may appear to have been too high and the valuation too low), the elimination of certain investors from participation
in the plan might be regarded as having been unwarranted and unduly
harsh. Valuation is also considered somewhat arbitrary: values are al-
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ways in flux because relevant conditions are always changing. A particular valuation figure, obtained at a given instant on the basis of the
special circumstances of that moment, may well not be the same figure
that would be obtained by the same process at a later date when circumstances have changed. Pushed to an extreme, the position suggests that
no valuation should ever take place because any valuation is always subject to attack as evanescent-the valuation figure would always be different if it had been made either earlier or later. Thus, criticism of
valuation on the basis of changing conditions can prove too much, undermining the entire concept.
The imprecision of the valuation process has also led to the argument
that valuation is so malleable that the entire process is perverse-that,
in actuality, it is the reverse of what it seems to be. On this view, valuation is not an objective process by which projected earnings are capitalized to reach an ultimate figure under a procedure that has admitted
infirmities. Instead, these critics assert, the trustees or the courts first
determine the classes of claimants that should participate in the reorganization plan-on the basis of rough judgment or visceral reactions
or other unexpressed or even unexpressable criteria-and then select
the projection of earnings or the capitalization ratio necessary to reach
a valuation figure that will include the preselected groups. The valuation process is not viewed as unduly harsh or rigid, but rather as so flexible that it is subject to abuse.
A second major criticism of the strict priority rule is that it frequently eliminates common stockholders from participation in the
reorganized enterprise and thereby excludes the class of investments
usually owned by management. Since stock ownership provides not
only status and voting position but also a vehicle for possible capital
gains, management personnel may be unwilling to remain with the
reorganized firm as employees if the common stock interest is wiped
out in the reorganization. This is alleged to have an adverse effect upon
operation of the reorganized enterprise, at least where management has
something in the way of unique characteristics, specialized know-how,
or other particular abilities important to the enterprise. Although one
might respond that suitable management is always available at an appropriate price, critics would argue that existing management might
embody exceptional talent that the enterprise would be fortunate to
retain. Many enterprises fall into financial difficulties for reasons over
which management has no control, such as adverse economic conditions,
sudden shortages of essential raw materials, or assorted acts of fate. 5
15 In some instances management possesses unique know-how or controls sources of raw
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Forcing out management by eliminating the common stock may then
not be in the best interests of the enterprise.
A third but related criticism is that the strict priority doctrine unnecessarily fetters the court and the parties. Reorganization planners,
it is said, should have greater freedom in negotiating an imaginative
adjustment of various interests and should not be limited to determining participations pursuant to the strict priority doctrine. This broad
criticism subsumes, but goes beyond, the point that management is
often excluded through elimination of the common stock interest. It
builds on the fact that reorganization proceedings are so extremely
complex that they almost always present special circumstances or unusual attributes relevant to participation decisions. The conclusion
from this point of view is that the governing rules should permit adjustment and settlement on the basis of individual circumstances
rather than following the single, inexorable strict priority track.
A fourth criticism is that the strict priority doctrine introduces unreasonable delay in the reorganization process by extending litigation
over its proper application. The valuation process involves so much
speculation that it almost always provides grounds for attack by those
adversely affected by the result. These attacks, it is claimed, lead to a
proliferation of appeals and to even longer delays. The longer the
final disposition of the reorganization proceedings is postponed, the
more likely it is that circumstances affecting the enterprise may change;
the premises upon which the original valuation was based may no
longer apply, and revaluation in light of changed circumstances may be
sought or granted. The long and complicated valuation process may
then take place again, followed in turn by a replay of the appeals
process and its consequent delay. A well recognized strategy has been
developed around the possibility of favorable shifts in the underlying
circumstances affecting valuation. The scenario is to protract the litigation by any means so that a basis for an upward revaluation may somehow develop somewhere along the way.
The extension of litigation increases the cost of reorganization. Apart
from the expenses of appeal, the mere retention of an enterprise in the
reorganization court imposes business restraints and disabilities that are
exceedingly costly and burdensome to the enterprise. In extreme situations the costs of delay and unnecessary legal proceedings could force a
materials or indispensible customer good will that would vanish if certain management
personalities were to withdraw from the business following elimination of their equity
interest. A more likely effect is merely to deprive the reorganized company of whatever
benefits flow from continuity in management.
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beleaguered corporation out of reorganization into straight bankruptcy.
It is therefore argued that if the strict priority doctrine were not mandatory, or if some flexibility were built into it, the parties might more
readily agree upon a plan of reorganization and avert extended litigation over valuation.
A fifth criticism of the strict priority doctrine-a somewhat oblique
one--derives from the present division of reorganization procedures
between Chapter X, in which the strict priority doctrine is mandatory,
and Chapter XI, to which it does not apply. Management will ordinarily try to come under Chapter XI in order to avoid appointment
of an independent trustee, avert application of the strict priority doctrine, and seek a composition-type readjustment with a scaling down of
all or part of the outstanding unsecured debt. Senior creditors, shareholders outside the management group, or the SEC may seek to have
the proceedings transferred from Chapter XI to Chapter X, upon the
principle that proper allocation of proceedings between the two chapters depends upon the nature of the enterprise, its difficulties, and the
character of its creditors and shareholders. The issue of which chapter
applies to the particular enterprise may cause extended litigation, although the real issue between the parties is whether the strict priority
doctrine eventually should apply. The fundamental question concerning the applicability of the strict priority doctrine will be masked and
never openly and directly at issue.
A sixth attack upon the strict priority doctrine comes from those who
assert that a reorganization should impose proportional sacrifices upon
investors by making priorities relative rather than absolute. This position rests upon the notion that it is fairest for investors' participation
in the reorganized enterprise to be based on the values of their respective securities immediately prior to the debacle. The suggestion substitutes an order of priority based upon market or going concern values
for an order based upon contract provisions governing involuntary
liquidations. This proposal has great appeal for junior creditors and
shareholders. It was adopted in readjustments under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, 16 but has never won acceptance in bankruptcy
reorganizations.
In connection with its criticism of the strict priority doctrine, both
the report of the Bankruptcy Commission 17 and a recent article by one
16 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79K (1970).
17 REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNnTED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. pt. I, at 259 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE
BANKRUPTCY COMM'N].
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of its consultants' 8 regard the fundamental issue in a reorganization
proceeding as the determination of who shall receive the difference
between the enterprise's liquidation value and its higher reorganization
value. Under the strict priority doctrine the total valuation of the enterprise goes to the claimants in order of their involuntary liquidation
priorities. The Bankruptcy Commission and its consultant apparently
agree that the liquidation value of the enterprise should be distributed
to claimants in order of strict priority, but they submit that the difference between liquidation value and any higher reorganization value
could be more properly handled in a different manner. They do not
specify why this particular "upper" layer of total valuation should be
treated differently from the liquidation component of total valuation,
nor do they indicate who has a better claim upon the "excess." But
they leave the impression that, being of a different character, the
"upper" layer should be available to some extent to junior interests
even when seniors have not been fully compensated according to prevailing doctrines.
One might ask why liquidation value should be discussed at all in a
specialized proceeding in which liquidation is not contemplated. The
underlying purpose of the reorganization sections of the Bankruptcy
Act is to provide a procedure and a milieu in which to work out a plan
of reorganization that permits continued operation of the company to
avert liquidation. At the present time, liquidation value is seldom
ascertained in a reorganization proceeding. By introducing the liquida9
tion value concept as a separable item in the reorganization process' and
pursuing the analysis by asking how this segment of incremental value
should be allocated, the central question of fairness is begged: a dubious
assumption is treated as if it were an unassailable axiom. The assumption that the courts should not apportion the entire reorganization
value among the interested parties in order of contractual priority
implicitly attacks the core of the present concept of fairness in a reorganization. If the assumption of the Bankruptcy Commission on this
point is accepted, a significant change in reorganization doctrine will
occur more readily than if the traditional concept of unsegmented
valuation is retained. In turn, such a change in doctrine will inevitably
alter the permissible pattern for distributing securities under a plan
20
of reorganization.
18 Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of Creditors or
Stockholders?, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 540 (1973).
19 If the concept of "excess" value were adopted, it would apparently be necessary
for the court to make two findings of value in each proceeding, namely liquidation value
and reorganization value, instead of finding only reorganization value.
20 The absolute priority doctrine has been accepted and referred to as a standard
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Another of the Bankruptcy Commission's criticisms of the absolute
priority doctrine deserves attention: "Unfortunately, the rigidity of the
rule has frequently resulted in the destruction rather than the protection of interests of public investors. Public debt security holders (frequently subordinated to trade and financial institution debt) and public
equity security holders are frequently eliminated from participation in
a reorganization by reason of the strict application of a statute designed
primarily for their protection. '2 1 Interpreting this statement is not easy.
It seems to deal with situations in which reorganization value is less
than the aggregate of senior claims; it seems to argue that in such situations Chapter X was designed to preserve an interest in the firm for
(public) juniors at the expense of the (institutional) seniors. This is a
strange reading of history. Chapter X clearly was designed to protect
investors, whether seniors or juniors and whether public or private;
but it was to do so by preserving for them any going concern or other
value to which they could rightfully lay claim-after the claims of
more senior interests, if any, had been satisfied in full.
Chapter X was drawn against a factual backdrop of senior debt held
largely by public investors, in opposition to equity investment often
drawn from other than widespread public sources. At present the prevailing pattern may be different; holders of senior debt may largely be
institutional investors and public investment may be mainly in the
form of subordinated debentures or preferred or common stock. It
would be peculiar, however, to make the new pattern a premise for
reconstructing the strict priority doctrine in order to erode the position
of current seniors and benefit current juniors on the theory that the
juniors are now more likely to be public holders. Is the standard of
fair distribution in reorganizations to change depending upon current
fashions in financing? Is the rule to be different in cases where senior
debt is publicly and not institutionally held?
III
These criticisms of the absolute priority doctrine have given rise to a
variety of suggested changes in the standard of fairness to govern reorganizations in bankruptcy. Although none of these suggestions is
wholly new, each is worth exploration in view of the new interest
stimulated by the recent Bankruptcy Commission report.
of fairness in a number of matters outside the reorganization field-for example, in dis-

cussions about the fairness of mergers. One might wonder how these other areas would
be affected by a modification of the absolute priority doctrine in bankruptcy reorganizations under each of the proposals discussed in the text.
21 REaroR op Tm BANKRUPTCY Comm'N, supra note 17, pt. I, at 256.
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One type of proposal for relaxing the absolute priority doctrine
seeks to adjust the weight given involuntary liquidation rights in a
bankruptcy reorganization. Today the courts view reorganization as a
substitute for liquidation and conclude that the rights of investors in
reorganizations should, at least in theory, be ordered and measured as
if an involuntary liquidation were under way. The thrust of this position is best illustrated in the case of a large preferred stock arrearage,
which is entitled to priority over common stock in an involuntary
liquidation. In reorganization, preferred stock has priority over the
common up to the full dollar amount of the arrearage-even though
the arrearage rights do not bear interest, could have been eliminated
by charter amendment or merger, and are not mandatorily payable
except on liquidation.
Strict adherence to this liquidation standard would take into account
only liquidation features of securities in measuring claims in reorganizations; any feature that affected the quality or market value of the
security before liquidation, such as interest rates, would be irrelevant.
Owners of bonds commanding a market premium due to an exceptionally high rate of interest (gauged by current market rates) have no claim
in reorganization for the premium; holders of bonds selling at a discount due to a below-market rate of interest have a claim for the full
principal amount of the obligations. From some perspectives it does appear anomalous to measure claimants' rights only in liquidation terms
when in fact a reorganization has permitted the enterprise to continue
in operation. No doubt this incongruity goes far to explain why the
liquidation standard has in practice never been pushed to its logical
conclusions and why high interest rate bonds have generally received
22
"better" treatment in reorganizations than low interest rate bonds.
But every proposal to modify the liquidation standard runs into the
hard problem of specifying the circumstances to which a new standard
should apply. The most extreme proposals call for measuring every
claim in reorganization on the assumption that the enterprise is to continue rather than be liquidated. 23 This approach resembles the investment value standard that was used for readjustment purposes in pro22 These matters are discussed in Blum, supra note 2.
23 The liquidation standard is used to measure claims against the debtor and its

property, and the relationship among claimants. The value of the debtor's property,
out of which the claims are satisfied to the extent possible, is measured on the basis
of a going concern concept in Chapter X proceedings. It is not inconsistent or inappropriate to assume continuation of the enterprise to determine its value and to use
a liquidation concept to measure the extent of claims and the relation between claimants.
The purposes of the two standards are different. See Green River Steel Corp., SEC Corp.
Reorg. Release No. 105 (Jan. 24, 1957).
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ceedings under the Public Utility Holding Company Act.24 Use of a
nonliquidation standard was warranted there because the enterprise
was undergoing change not voluntarily, not because of financial difficulty, but because of the legislative mandate to break up or simplify
certain public utility holding company systems.
In reorganizations brought on by financial difficulties a standard
that disregards liquidation claims is manifestly unfair in that it defeats
important expectations: it in effect gives senior security holders, who
bargained for specific protection in case of financial distress, smaller
claims as the enterprise moves into a more precarious position. Once
one retreats from this sweeping but unfair position, however, there is
no obvious way to prescribe which rights should be measured by the
liquidation standard and which by a going concern standard. 25

IV
Another type of proposal for relaxing the absolute priority doctrine
would give the reorganization judge wide discretion to depart from it
if he found that strict adherence would not be in the best interests of
those it is intended to benefit. These suggestions generally stem from
the complaint that reorganization proceedings are longer and more
costly than necessary. They are also usually premised on the thought
that rigid conformity to absolute priority contributes to this result
either by stimulating junior interests to fight harder to avoid exclusion
from the reorganized firm, or, especially where circumstances are
genuinely extraordinary, by making it impossible to compromise in a
reasonable manner that takes particulars into account.
Although the suggestions in this vein have recently been directed
against absolute priority, there was an extended period during which
they were most often heard in connection with controversies over the
proper scope of Chapters X and XI.26 The main contention apparently
was that all investors, including senior security holders, would, under
some circumstances, be better off in a cheaper and shorter Chapter XI
24 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970).
25 See Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations:
New Directions, 67 HAav. L. REv. 553 (1954); Blum, The "New Directions" for Priority
Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 67 HAv. L. REv. 1367 (1954); cf. Frye, supra
note 2.

28 The literature evaluating proposals to combine Chapters X and XI into one new

chapter includes Quittner, Should a Chapter X
be Enacted for Rehabilitation of the
Middle Size Corporation?42 REP. J. 37 (1968); Rochelle & Balzersen, Recommendations
for Amendments to Chapter X, 46 Am. B
. L.J. 93 (1972); Weintraub & Levin, From
U.S. Realty to American Trailer Rentals: The Availability of Debtor Relief for the Middle.

Sized Corporation,34 FORDISAM L. Rav. 419 (1966).
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adjustment than in a Chapter X reorganization, despite the latter's
procedural and substantive safeguards for senior interests. This dichotomy brought the absolute priority rule into focus, because it is one
of the main substantive safeguards available under Chapter X but not
Chapter XI. History is revealing here. Once the courts took a more
expansive view of the proper reach of Chapter XI and became less
sympathetic to the transfer of cases from Chapter XI to Chapter X,
interest in relaxing the Chapter X strict priority doctrine seemed to de27
cline sharply.
The trouble with conferring this wide discretion on the reorganization judge is patent. A chief concern behind the adoption of the absolute priority doctrine was to prevent junior investors from gaining
participation in a reorganized entity by trading on the nuisance value
of otherwise worthless claims. Explicit authorization of judicial discretion would again legitimate and encourage that technique. A mass
of experience reveals that courts have generally been prone to accept
compromises in order to expedite termination of lengthy proceedings
over complicated corporate financial matters and to avoid having to
make and carry out hard decisions. Nothing suggests that this temptation will be less in the future.
The ultimate weakness in permitting this exercise of discretion relates to valuation. Although one might be able to value the nuisance
participation given to juniors (and thus the cost to seniors), there is no
way to value the benefit to seniors that derives from expediting the
reorganization proceedings through a compromise. The value of an
uncalled bluff or an unfulfilled threat is never ascertainable. It is
therefore sheer guesswork whether on balance the seniors will be better
27 The history is set out in Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) as
Proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission, 47 Am. Bhaqa. L.J. 823 (1973). See also SEC v.

United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); General Stores Corp. v.
Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965);
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC, 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963); SEC v. Canandaigua
Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964); In re KDI Corp., 477 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1973).
It is important to remember that reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act is a
drastic remedy and is usually sought in circumstances where voluntary adjustments ate
not feasible and where there is a need for judicial power to coerce dissenters. Voluntary
adjustment can take place outside the reorganization process if there are no dissenters
or if consent can be achieved by other forms of coercion. Conditions are most favorable
when there are only a few creditors or the creditors are in direct association, even
though there may be large numbers of equity investors. Voluntary arrangements with
creditors may be coupled with an internal recapitalization to achieve an overall plan.
Similarly, the SEC and the courts are less likely to insist on transfer from Chapter XI
to Chapter X when senior creditors are owed large amounts but are few in number than
when the same amount of debt is outstanding but is more widely dispersed. A dispersion
of equity interests, moreover, is unlikely to change the result.
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or worse off as a result of the give and take. By its very nature such a
compromise is unreviewable, except perhaps where the deal is so outrageous as to be deemed unconscionable or irrational.
Some observers with long memories might wish to add a caveat based
on experiences prior to acceptance of the absolute priority doctrine. It
was common for proceedings to be stretched out by juniors in order to
enhance the nuisance value of their position. A well understood
strategy was developed by juniors to puff up tenuous or doubtful claims,
leading to something of a vicious circle: acceptance of compromise on
nuisance claims encouraged assertion of more claims, which in turn led
to a greater willingness by courts to accept compromises in order to
terminate reorganization proceedings.
It has been recently argued that this history is not relevant because
there now is adequate judicial control of the reorganization procedure.
The absolute priority doctrine, it is said, was fashioned when judicial
surveillance of the reorganization process was less sophisticated and
against a background of unhealthy dominance or collusion in reorganizations by management and investment bankers-a dominance that
frequently resulted in plans that were unfair to public senior investors.
With reorganization proceedings now carefully observed or controlled
by courts and the SEC. the argument is that this potential unfairness
has virtually been removed. Because courts can determine when plans
that depart from strict application of the doctrine are nevertheless fair
to senior classes, it is asserted that the need for absolute priority is no
28
longer present.
That reasoning is misleading. It implies that all or most judges recognize a fair deal or a good business arrangement when they see one. It
also assumes that there has been full disclosure and a complete understanding of the impact and ramifications of the proposed reorganization plan. Even more important, if plan negotiations are to be kept in
bounds and if judicial review of plans is to be meaningful, the reorganization system cannot do without the ability to articulate why a deal
is fair or reasonable from a business point of view. The potential for
that exposition is a great strength of the absolute priority doctrine; its
absence is a great weakness of any nebulous test based on a doctrine of
"it looks all right to me."
In a sense, proposals to relax the strict priority rule constitute a rejection of the
SEC's expertise in the reorganization field. In its much praised Committee Study Report,
see 1940 REPor, supra note 12, the SEC emphasized the potential for unfairness, dilatory
tactics, and undesirable allocations of securities if the strict priority doctrine were not
applied. Moreover, in its role as a commentator upon reorganization plans, the SEC
has issued numerous position statements advocating absolute priority.
28
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The Bankruptcy Commission has offered its own version of a seemingly gentle but possibly wide-reaching plan for discretionary relaxation
of the absolute priority rule. In the case of a corporation with publicly
held securities, a plan of reorganization would at most need to be supported by findings that there is "a reasonable basis for the valuation on
which the plan is based" and that there is "a reasonable probability"
that the consideration distributed to creditors and stockholders is full
compensation for their respective interests. 29 These propositions may
actually reflect current application of the absolute priority doctrine.
The wording, however, is apt to encourage some reorganization courts
to expand the limits of fairness under the doctrine. The language could
be taken to mean that in place of full compensation, as understood
under existing standards, senior investors are entitled to something
less-perhaps best labeled "probable full compensation"--whatever
that signifies. 80
There is an obvious explanation for the recent coolness of the Bankruptcy Commission and certain commentators towards the absolute
priority doctrine. Their main dissatisfaction may not be with the
doctrine itself, but with the fact that rigid adherence to the doctrine is
a major impediment in the path of another innovation: the development of a single procedural framework for handling all corporate readjustments under the Bankruptcy Act, merging Chapters X and XI into
a unified new chapter. The real preference appears to be not so much
a relaxation of the fairness standard as it is the replacement of the
present bifurcated system (which conceals the question of the governing
doctrine of fairness in the struggle over the "appropriate" chapter for
securing relief) at the expense of the strict priority concept.
An unavoidable dilemma is admittedly present in the current system,
which necessarily lodges a large degree of discretion in reorganization
judges regarding the appropriate forum-a discretion that is often difficult to review. By allowing a proceeding to go forward under Chapter
XI, a judge can deny unsecured senior investors the protection of the
absolute priority doctrine. The latitude of this discretion, however, is
probably more confined than that which would accompany a doctrine
predicated upon the "sound business deal," or an equivalent departure
29 REPORT OF THE BANKRUPTCY COMm'N, supra note 17, pt. II, at 252 (section
7-310(d)(2)(B) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973).
80 "This is, of course, a considerable modification of Chapter X's 'fair and equitable'
test at least as interpreted by some court decisions, in that the valuation under [the
commission's proposed new] Chapter VII may not necessarily be that based upon a
capitalization of estimated earning power if 'there is a reasonable basis' for another valuation." Coogan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions for the Non-Bankruptcy Business Lawyer, 29 Bus. LAw. 729, 752 (1974).
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from the strict priority rule. By now, it is generally understood that
certain distress situations properly belong under Chapter X with its
absolute priority rule. Junior interests, however, would rarely refrain
from contending that to allow them to participate in the reorganized
enterprise would be a "good" or "sound" arrangement.
In a few reorganizations it can perhaps be concluded in the light of
hindsight that all classes of investors would have been better off if a deal
proposed by junior interests had been validated, even though it did not
comport with the absolute priority doctrine. This relatively infrequent
situation should not be given much weight in fashioning the general
law of reorganizations. For that task, the critical question is whether,
taking account of all reorganizations, fairness-especially to senior
investors-will more often result from explicitly giving judges broad
and amorphous discretion to depart from absolute priority notions, or
confrom denying them that discretion, always bearing in mind that
desiderable discretion is indirectly and inherently involved both in
upon
passing
in
and
relief
for
termining the appropriate procedure
the valuation of the firm.
to
An alternative method of relaxing the absolute priority rule is
senior
those
of
place the power to make departures in a super-majority
investors unfavorably affected by the relaxation of the rule, rather
than in the reorganization judge. This proposal runs contrary to the
deeply embedded notion that even a two-thirds or three-fourths
majority of a class should not be permitted to impose an unfair plan
on a dissenting minority. A forceful argument can nevertheless be made
that, given proper judicial and administrative scrutiny and exclusion of
cross-voting by seniors with conflicting interests, a very large (say a
nine-tenths) majority of the relevant senior investors should be able to
waive rights conferred on their class by the absolute priority doctrine.
V
Another type of proposal for relaxing the absolute priority rule
focuses on the interests of stockholders who are also managers of the
company undergoing reorganization. Like the plans for discretionary
abandonment of strict priority, these proposals grow out of the historical relationship between Chapter X and Chapter XI. Both chapters
originally contained the requirement that a plan of reorganization be
"fair and equitable." The courts, after absolute priority had been read
into the "fair and equitable" clause of Chapter X, were presented with
the question of how compositions could be acceptable under the "fair
and equitable" language of Chapter XI. This problem was critical be-
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cause it was widely understood that Chapter XI was specifically designed to work out compositions, primarily with trade creditors; indeed,
the chapter was considered a replacement for the prior composition
section of the Bankruptcy Act.
The answer to the question was not long in arriving, and on the
whole it has been both sound in theory and workable in practice.
Chapter XI compositions between debtor and creditors can survive the
fair and equitable test, even where the debtor is clearly insolvent, because the usual Chapter XI composition preserves values for the debtor
that are not accessible to the creditors anyway. In the typical situation,
the debtor is an owner-operator of the enterprise and the creditors are
businessmen or financiers who can fend for themselves in negotiating
compositions 1 According to the theory, something of value-whether
it be called good will, know-how, or trade connections-inheres in the
owner-operators of the distressed business, and this value would disappear if they were forced out of the firm or if the business were liquidated. Since that value cannot be captured for creditors, fairness is not
violated if an arrangement under Chapter XI leaves that value in the
hands of the owner-operators, especially since the chapter requires consent by a stated majority of sophisticated creditors. The corollary is that
creditors are entitled to not less than they could realize through an
immediate liquidation of the enterprise. This standard of protection
has come to be regarded as reflecting the best interest of the creditors;
in time the "fair and equitable" language in Chapter XI was replaced
with an explicit "best interest of the creditors" test.3 2
The answer does have one weakness and it has not gone unnoticed,
especially as the scope of Chapter XI has been broadened by court decisions. In some corporations undergoing Chapter XI reorganization,
overlap between the shareholders and the operators of the business is
not complete, and some of the creditors are not of the "fend for themselves" type. When there is substantial variance between stock ownership and management, a Chapter XI arrangement-which of course
requires creditors to give up rights-would always seem to fail the
absolute priority test. By and large this difficulty has been glossed over,
probably because the overwhelming majority of Chapter XI cases
appear to involve a close identity between owners and managers. It
would no longer be possible to disregard the underlying problem if
Chapters X and XI were telescoped into a single framework.
To meet the problem, it has been proposed that shareholders be en31 See, e.g., SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
32 The history is summarized in the dissenting opinion in General Stores Corp. v.
Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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titled to participation in a reorganized firm whenever they contribute
value to the enterprise as managers, whether the plan would presently
come under Chapter X or Chapter XI. The most recent version of this
approach to relax absolute priority is contained in the legislation proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission. The commission's plan would
permit stockholders who "will make a contribution which is important
to the operation of the reorganized debtor or the successor under the
plan" to participate "on a basis which reasonably approximates the
value, if any, of their interests, and the additional estimated value of
such contribution .... "83 On initial impression this proposed change
seems to be a logical extension of the old Chapter XI notion that value
inhering exclusively in the owner-operators of a corporation cannot be
considered as value available to creditors. The extrapolation is, however, not free of difficulty.
In a reorganization proceeding many practical consequences flow
from the timing of a determination whether good will or going concern
value inheres in the owner-operator and is available to others. Under
the present system this determination is in effect made when a decision
is reached on the appropriateness of Chapter XI. If the statute is
changed to provide a single procedural system for corporate readjustments, the determination could be made at the outset of the proceedings-perhaps together with the decision whether to leave the existing
management in control or to appoint an independent trustee--or later,
when the terms of a plan are reviewed. The former alternative is
preferable. One can only speculate about the feasibility of appointing
that some
an independent trustee and later entertaining the argument
4 There is also
group.
management
ousted
the
good will does inhere in
the intriguing possibility that a management group will be left undisturbed at the outset, only to have the contention raised later that no
33 REPORT oF THE BANKRUpcY CoM'N, supra note 17, pt. H, at 242 (section 7-303(4)
of the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973).
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going concern value inheres in the owner-operators. In a unitary procedural framework, if the role of the owner-operators is not determined
at the outset, the unfortunate tendency may develop of allowing management to retain control of the enterprise in order not to prejudice
the later decision on participation by the owner-managers.
The logic of the proposed change calls for a distinction between those
equity owners who make a management contribution and those who do
not, even though this approach may result in allowing part of a class of
stockholders to participate while excluding others in the same class. It
would be necessary to define precisely what holdings are to be regarded
as management shares. Is the category, for example, to include shares
held by the wife of a manager? By his children? By a family trust in
which he has an interest? The difficulty of the large question is seen in
the elaborate attempts of the Internal Revenue Code to attribute, under
some circumstances, the shares of one person or legal entity to another
for income tax purposes.35
The approach also requires measuring the "non-monetary" contribution that specific shareholders make to the enterprise. The change proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission would necessitate putting an
exact value on the shareholder-manager contribution. The "best interest of the creditors" test circumvented this difficulty: in a "proper"
case, part or all of the value in excess of liquidation value could (at least
in theory) be claimed by the shareholders through a composition. In a
typical composition between a closely-held corporate debtor and its
trade and institutional creditors, the results should be the same as
that now reached under Chapter XI; all value above liquidation value
can be viewed as inhering in the shareholders and hence as reflecting
a contribution by them if the enterprise is continued. But this is not
the case when the "going concern" value inheres in only some of the
shareholder-managers. It is almost impossible to quantify the value of
the contribution made by particular shareholders.
Much of the difficulty can be traced to confusion over the nature of
"going concern" value. In the typical Chapter XI corporate situation,
the practical choice is either to liquidate the business or to bring about
an adjustment that is satisfactory to both the shareholders and the
requisite majority of creditors. It is realistic to assume that the creditors
do not wish to take over the equity position and carry on the business;
their interests are not those of long-term investors. Given the alternative of imminent liquidation, the going concern value can properly be
thought of as all value in excess of liquidation value. The entire going
S5

See

INT. REv. CODE of

1954, § 318.
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concern value is beyond the reach of the creditors. In sharp contrast
are those situations in which "special" shareholders can make a contribution to the enterprise as managers, but because their potential
contribution is not unique and they can be replaced, there is no need
to liquidate the firm if they cease to be associated with it. Although the
"special" shareholders by hypothesis add value, the measure of it cannot reasonably be tied to liquidation value. In these cases the going
concern value can realistically be captured by creditors if hiring other
management provides a viable alternative to liquidation.
It was noted earlier that the Bankruptcy Commission and certain
commentators have argued that, as a general principle, distribution of
the going concern differential (reflecting the difference between immediate liquidation value and value as a reorganized concern) should
be a proper subject for negotiation and division between shareholders
6
and debt-holders in reorganizations.3 The weakness of this argument
now emerges. When reorganization value falls short of total creditor
claims, shareholders should have no equity in the firm and should be
cut out unless the going concern differential inheres in the particular
shareholders as irreplaceable operators of the business and not merely
as holders of common shares.
There is yet another difficulty with the proposed change. Assume
that some shareholders add measurable value to the corporation as
managers. It is illogical to reward them for that contribution by giving
extraordinary participation in the reorganization to their stockholdings. The value is added by them only as managers, and not as stockholders. Logically, they should be compensated as managers and not as
stockholders-whether in cash, stock options, or by other arrangements.
This direct approach avoids the other difficulties noted with the proposed change. There would be no occasion to distinguish among those
in a single class of shareholders. There would be no need to provide
rules for determining precisely what shares are to be treated as owned
by the shareholder-managers. And there would be a sounder guideline
by which to determine how much compensation a particular shareholder deserves for serving as manager.
One might appropriately ask whether there are situations in which
stockholders make special contributions to a corporation as owners
rather than as managers. On occasion it is urged that totally inactive
shareholders can benefit the corporation by having their names associated with it-by knowing the right people in government, industry, or
the financial world. Perhaps these benefits are real. But in all cases the
36 See text and notes at notes 17-18 supra.
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special equities urged by these stockholders should be ignored. Contributions of this kind are impossible to quantify; their existence is
likely to be tenuous or debatable; and they are least deserving of compensation in terms of sound notions of fairness. All the vices of nuisance
claims can accompany their recognition as a legitimate ground for
participation in reorganizations. If it is important to have the use of
the names or connections of certain persons, they can perhaps be hired
like product endorsers or consultants.
It has also been repeatedly urged that one good reason to include old
shareholders in a reorganization is that they may constitute the only
available source of additional capital for the enterprise. This contention may have had a basis in fact at an earlier date. Current data do
not support the belief that old shareholders are a fruitful source of
additional funds when the public capital markets are unlikely to provide funds. In recent years shareholders have seldom contributed new
capital; at best, they have tried to ward off liquidation by convincing
others to put in new resources to keep the enterprise going.
VI
The most common type of proposal to modify the absolute priority
doctrine is to relax the finality of the reorganization valuation. These
suggestions rely on a deceptively simple argument. Valuation determines the classes of claimants that can participate in the reorganized
entity. The process of arriving at a valuation by capitalizing estimated
earnings involves prediction founded on much guesswork. There is
always a possibility that earnings will be higher than forecast, or that
interest rates will drop significantly, or that market price-earnings
ratios will rise substantially. If any of these events takes place, the
enterprise will be worth more on a future date than the initial reorganization valuation. Those investors who have not been allowed to
participate because of the "mistakenly" low valuation will suffer an
alleged injustice. The contention is that it is only fair to arrange at the
outset for a squeezed-out class to come back into the enterprise if the
future is markedly better than predicted in arriving at the initial reorganization valuation.
By now the shortcoming in this line of thought is quite familiar: the
future just might be worse than predicted. Proper valuation takes into
account the probabilities of falling short of predictions as well as of
exceeding them. The participating classes that receive equity interests
in the reorganized corporation or debt securities with fixed interest
rates take the risk in both directions. To require them to share good
fortune with an excluded class while demanding that they bear the
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provide them with less than full
full burden of bad fortune would
87
claims.
their
for
compensation
This logical answer has never satisfied those who sympathize with
junior classes in reorganizations, nor those who are skeptical about the
entire valuation process. Early in the development of reorganization
doctrine, they argued for issuing warrants to a marginally excluded
class of investors, the warrant being viewed as an interest whose value
was contingent on the success of the reorganized enterprise. When the
SEC took a strong stand against issuance of warrants in reorganizations
8
-in part on fairness grounds but largely on feasibility notions3 -the
"second guessers" suggested that additional stock be issued at a future
time to the excluded class if the affairs of the enterprise exceeded
initial expectations.
The most recent version of the "second chance" idea is contained in
the legislation proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission.
87 For a crisp presentation of this relationship, see Spitze v. Stichman, 278 F.2d 402,
405-06 (2d Cir. 1960).

38The case against the issuance of long-term warrants has been well stated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in Child's Co., 24 S.E.C. 85, 121-22 (1946):
Long-term option warrants are unsound from the standpoint of the company....

In fact, the obligation of the company ...

may constitute an impediment to further

equity financing.
Long-term option warrants are also objectionable from the standpoint of the
public interest. Since they constitute merely a call on common stock they are likely
to be subject to extraordinarily wide fluctuations on the market. Their extreme
market instability is no doubt increased by the difficulty of determining their value.
Graham and Dodd make the following supplementary comment in their discussions
of warrants:
The basic fact about an option warrant, therefore, is that it represents
Warrants to
something that has been taken away from the common stock. ....
buy stock, even at a price about the market, therefore detract from the present
value of the common stock, because part of this present value is based upon
the right to benefit from future improvement. . . . The option warrant is a
fundamentally dangerous and objectionable device because it effects an indirect
and usually unrecognized dilution of common-stock values....
It is significant that the New York Stock Exchange has refused in recent years to
admit long-term warrants to trading and at the present time none are listed on the
Exchange.
See also 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 84, 92 (1946) (footnote omitted):
Mhe issuance of such "immediately valueless paper" may at least be questioned
both on the ground that it adds to the complexity of capital structures which
issuance of these interests tends to
the
should be simplified, and on the ground
place on the market securities which do not meet a reasonable investment standard.
the existence of warrants or participation rights decreases the value
Furthermore,
while
the new
common
senior claims to the extent that
with
to participants
given stockholders
stock
of common
must
bearmore
the first
impact of future losses, they
gains.corporations registering securities under
of future
will not get the full benefit
It should also be noted that the SEC requires
the Securities Act of 1933 to include
"boilerplate" paragraph setting forth,
warrants or options to buy stock of
tential dilution and the impediment
or options.

in their registration statements and prospectuses a
as a matter of necessary disclosure with respect to
the registrant corporation, the nature of the poto future financing attributable to such warrants
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A plan of reorganization... may include, if the plan is based on
an estimated valuation which would preclude other participation
by any class of creditors . . . or equity security holders of the
debtor, provisions for delayed participation rights for such a class
or classes [or] holders ... conditioned on the court's determination within a period specified in the plan but not later than five
years from the date of confirmation that the reorganized debtor or
the successor under the plan has attained a financial status that
warrants such participation .... 39
Although this change in absolute priority doctrine involves the unfair
asymmetry of risks that characterizes all "second look" propositions, the
ramifications of the particular recommendation deserve a closer look.
One possible reading of the proposal is that it would permit a court
to authorize a second (but higher) valuation of the enterprise several
years after confirmation of a reorganization plan. It is difficult to credit
that interpretation. The valuation process is usually the stickiest part of
reorganization procedure; it is expensive, time-consuming, sensitive,
and controversial. Inviting a full replay several years later would undermine the process by denigrating the first stage and rendering its result vulnerable to erosion at a later date.
A narrower reading of the proposal is that it would allow a review,
at the end of a specified time span, of only limited aspects of the
initial valuation analysis. One model could be the "earn-out" formulas
commonly used in corporate acquisitions, under which the amount of
stock in the acquiring company transferred to the shareholders of the
acquired company ultimately depends on the earnings record of the
acquired company during a certain period immediately following the
acquisition. By way of illustration, a reorganization plan could provide
for comparing forecast earnings and actual earnings at the end of five
years.
This is easier said than done. The formula would have to specify
whether the controlling experience is to be highest earnings, average
earnings, or mean earnings during the period. Unfairness to the old
seniors would be compounded if the highest level of earnings were
determinative, a point most easily seen if highest earnings are achieved
somewhat prior to the last year of the contingency period and there is a
subsequent downtrend.
Moreover, a built-in conflict of interest in stating earnings would
exist between the old juniors, who wish to validate their contingent
participations, and the old seniors, who wish to stand pat on the initial
89 REPORT oF THE BANKRUPTCY COMM'N,
of' the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973).

supra note

17, pt. H, at 241 (section 7-303(3)
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distribution. Companies have, within accepted accounting conventions,
considerable flexibility and room for maneuver in stating earnings
over the span of a few years. As with earn-out deals, a carefully executed
contingent participation arrangement pursuant to a plan must set
ground rules for computing actual earnings during the trial years. It
may also be imperative to spell out limitations on the freedom of
management to pursue policies that are calculated to maximize earnings
a few years down the line at the expense of earnings in the years immediately ahead. In some situations it may also be necessary to restrict
other corporate activities, including mergers, sales of divisions, abandonments, product shifts, and various financial readjustments.
In practice, it may be difficult to keep an earn-out type of contingent
arrangement from turning into a general reopening of the valuation
question. Theoretically the two formulations are quite distinct. If
valuation were re-examined at a fixed time after confirmation of a plan,
attention would focus upon projected earnings from that date forward
and upon proper capitalization rates at that date. In contrast, a contingent earnings arrangement is in principle concerned only with
"actual" earnings between confirmation of the plan and the fixed date.
Whether a reorganization court could in practice keep revaluation arguments and pressures from contaminating contingent arrangements is a
matter of speculation. Consider an extreme situation: although the
enterprise has not registered earnings during the contingency period
above original projections, there is a broad consensus that, shortly after
the cutoff date, earnings will increase significantly. These facts do not
validate the contingent rights; they arguably call for a higher valuation.
Yet can anyone be sure what a court would do with the rights of the
parties under these circumstances?
A related difficulty needs to be explored. The heart of a customary
earn-out scheme is reaching a quantitative relationship between actual
earnings and the number of additional shares to be distributed if there
is a favorable earnings record. In corporate acquisitions this relationship is established through arms-length bargaining in what amounts to
a market transaction. Although a reorganization plan is almost certain
to reflect a degree of direct or indirect negotiation among classes of
investors, the purpose of having a standard of fairness is to establish
discernible boundaries for proper dealings. An earnings contingency
arrangement is in this respect no different from any other distributional
aspect of a reorganization plan.
The task of working out the relationship between earnings and the
contingent distribution is challenging. As an illustration, consider a
reorganization in which, if no contingency arrangement were permitted,
old stockholders would be cut out of the enterprise and the whole
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equity in the reorganized firm would be allocated to old bondholders
because the enterprise had a value less than their priority liquidation
claim. Assume that the valuation was appropriately reached by capitalizing projected earnings. 40 The key question for present consideration
is how to integrate an earnings contingency arrangement into the
valuation process.
The ultimate hurdle has already been placed and marked. If the
valuation process were conducted in proper fashion, it would be unfair
to the old bondholders to introduce a contingency element into the
distribution. Under the initial valuation they are (it is assumed) entitled to the entire equity after reorganization. To dilute their position
in the future through a contingency aspect is to force them into the
unfair gamble of heads loses all-tails wins only part. If this hurdle is
simply ignored, is it possible to delineate an analytical approach to
fixing the amount of contingent participation for old shareholders?
The problem can be illuminated by further developing the illustration: assume the bondholders have a priority liquidation claim of
$5,000,000 and the enterprise is valued for reorganization purposes at
$4,000,000-leaving a negative equity for the old shareholders. This
valuation was reached by capitalizing estimated annual future earnings
of $400,000 at 10 percent. The valuation process included an adequate review of both the likelihood that earnings would be larger or
smaller than $400,000 and the risk rates associated with these other
possible levels. The distribution of earnings, probabilities, and risk
rates may be summarized as follows:
Earnings level
under $100,000
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
over 700,000

Likelihood
over 95%
95
80
65
50
35
20
5
less than 5

Risk rate
6%
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
more than 13

The plan of reorganization calls for an all common stock capital structure; 400,000 shares are to be allocated immediately to the old bondholders. The problem, to repeat, is how to go about fixing the terms on
40 In this illustration nothing turns on whether the valuation process consisted of
applying an appropriate single capitalization rate to the estimated most probable earnings, or applying some form of probabilities analysis to projected earnings and then

ascertaining an appropriate weighted capitalization rate. This point is illuminated in
V. BRuDNEY & M. Cnn rmN, CASES AND MATMRIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 65 (1972).
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which added shares are to be contingently distributable five years later
to the old shareholders.
At first glance it may be urged that the old stockholders should receive nothing unless earnings reached the $500,000 level by the cutoff
date, and that their participation should increase dollar for dollar above
that mark. The argument can be simply stated: it was decided during
the valuation process that 10 percent was the proper weighted rate at
which to capitalize actual earnings; application of that rate to earnings
of $500,000 (in a procedure that combined an earn-out formula with a
revaluation technique) would result in a valuation of $5,000,000-a
sum that just equalled the priority claim of the old bondholders. At a
$600,000 earnings level the enterprise would be worth $6,000,000, entitling old shareholders to one-sixth of the equity; at a $700,000 earnings level the enterprise would be worth $7,000,000, entitling the old
shareholders to two-sevenths of the equity. If earnings reached
$1,000,000 the old shareholders should, on this reasoning, end up with
one-half of the total.
Further reflection on the illustration indicates the fallacy of the
suggested hybrid approach. The initial $4,000,000 valuation took into
account the probabilities that the firm would earn more than $400,000
a year. The likelihood of doing so, however, was not great enough to
merit putting more than a $4,000,000 value on the enterprise. Assume
that five years later the firm earns not $400,000 but $1,000,000. This
fact alone would not warrant applying a 10 percent capitalization rate
to actual earnings and then treating the enterprise as worth $10,000,000.
At the time of initial valuation, the likelihood of earning $1,000,000
was placed at much less than 5 percent and the appropriate risk rate
was placed at much more than 13 percent. If the unlikely happens,
there is no reason to think that the 10 percent risk rate will still be the
proper one at which to capitalize the earnings that have in fact materialized. Nor is it satisfactory, if the proposed revision is adopted, to stick
with original projections of earnings and risks. To do so would mean
denying contingent participation to old shareholders and negating the
very purpose of the proposal.
No defensible middle course between these unacceptable extremes
has yet surfaced, and the prospects for finding one are not bright. Contingency arrangements in all probability will have to rest on sheer
compromise or arbitrary formulas, unsupported by an analytic structure
that would permit meaningful review. In essence, the basic question is:
how large a free ride are the old stockholders entitled to? The answer
is almost bound to be: whatever they can get!
It now becomes apparent that there likewise is no analytic basis for
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deciding when a junior class is entitled to some contingent participation
-as opposed to being excluded altogether. Once more the illustration is
helpful. If, as earlier assumed, the priority claim of the bondholders is
$5,000,000 and the firm is valued at $4,000,000, should the old stockholders be heard to argue for some contingent participation on the
ground that there is an estimated 35 percent chance that annual earnings would reach $500,000 (giving a $5,000,000 valuation if capitalized
at 10 percent)? The answer is clearly no. If the argument were accepted,
it could be used by the old stockholders even if the claim of the bondholders totaled $10,000,000. For under the estimates, there is some
chance-although much less than 5 percent-that the enterprise will
earn $1,000,000 a year.
The problem of allotting delayed participation rights to marginally
excluded claimants has an exact counterpart in the problem of augmenting the distribution to marginally included classes. Change the
illustration so that the bondholders' priority claim was only $3,000,000
and debenture holders were next in line with a priority claim of $2,000,
000. Assume that under the plan $3,000,000 of new shares go to the
old bondholders, the remaining $1,000,000 of new shares go to the
debenture holders, and the old common stockholders are wholly excluded. Should a favorable earnings record result in giving additional
securities to the excluded common stockholders without first enriching
the participation of the partially compensated debenture holders? Or
should the contingency arrangement first benefit the debenture holders,
and, if so, on what terms? Would it be necessary to reopen and recon41
sider the allocations to other participating classes as well? And what
type of proceeding would need to be developed to make these determinations?
The problems of defining a fair standard are underscored by considering once again, for contrast, an uncoerced corporate acquisition.
An "earn-out" contingency arrangement reflects a bargain in which the
acquired side accepts a smaller, unconditional amount initially in exchange for a shot at receiving a larger overall total if future earnings
are good. 42 The reorganization situation is never comparable. There
is no sense in which the old shareholders can be considered as accepting
41 A senior class that receives "full" compensation in a reorganization does not necessarly receive full payment in current market values. See Guarantee Trust Co. v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 802 N.Y. 658, 98 N.E2d 474 (1951). Would a reopening under a reorganization plan also encompass adjustment of the interest rate on the new debt securities?
42 For a general description of the earn-out concept, see Hecht, Earn-Outs, 2 MERGERs
& AcQUsiMONs, No. 4, at 2 (1967), and Hecht, The Certificate of Contingent Interest: A
Primer, 3 MERrEus &:AcQuIsrrIONs, No. 6, at 5 (1968).
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less now in order to get more later-for the simple reason that they are,
43
by hypothesis, entitled to nothing now.
It may not be reasonable or proper to single out earnings as the basis
for contingency participation when other variables might also change
during the period. Inflation, for example, could drive up earnings but
drive down the applicable multiplier even more-thus causing a lower
overall valuation. The company could earn more by taking on higher
risk operations, which would call for an upward revision in the capitalization rate. The worth of the enterprise could be heavily affected by
newly ascertained needs for replacement or rehabilitation not yet reflected in projected earnings. All these factors may be as relevant as the
earnings record; but to take them into account would necessitate a
second full-scale valuation of the firm.
This discussion may be charged with slighting the extraordinary
uncertainties and variables of the valuation process. Valuation of a
going concern, however, is always an uncertain thing. The essence of
a bankruptcy reorganization, which binds all parties whether or not
they accept the plan, involves imposing on them some kind of principled, disciplined conclusion as to value in the face of inescapable unm "
certainty. And a conclusion without an end is no conclusion.
The contingent participation arrangement proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission could conceivably be implemented in another
way. The conditional rights could be tied not to the earnings of the
enterprise but to the performance of its shares in the market. That
arrangement would present many of the same problems raised by an
earn-out type contingency scheme, and some additional ones as well.
The most crucial question would again concern the quantum of allowable contingent participation. To return to the illustration a final time:
suppose that all the new shares are awarded to the old creditors to satisfy
their liquidation priority claim of $5,000,000, which is greater than
the total value of the new equity. At the end of five years, let it be assumed, the market price of a share, when multiplied by the number of
43 It should be emphasized that reorganization is an alternative to liquidation, and
that the juniors would get nothing in liquidation.
44 This discussion brings to mind an anecdote told by Tom Corcoran about the
time when he served as law clerk to Justice Holmes. The Justice used to take late afternoon walks with his clerk in the outskirts of Washington. One day, while walking across
an open meadow, they came to a railroad track, which they followed to the bumper at
its end. The Justice ordered: "Salute that, son." Corcoran said, "I knew the Justice well
enough to do what I was told first and to ask questions afterwards. So I saluted and then

said, 'Mr. Justice, why did I salute that?"' Justice Holmes then announced, "Son, there
are damn few things in this world that really come to a final conclusion, and when you
see one of them, it's entitled to respect."
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shares outstanding, indicates that the entire equity is then worth
$20,000,000. On these facts should the issued shares be quadrupled,
with all additional shares (constituting three-fourths of the total) distributed to the old shareholders who were awarded conditional participation? Of course not! Market prices are notoriously unstable. Moreover, a giant leap is involved in using the market price of a small number of traded shares to value the equity as a whole. And even if these
two difficulties could be transcended, it would still be wrong to put the
entire risk of loss on the old creditors (who are the new unconditional
shareholders) and to confer the possibility of gain on the old shareholders (who receive only conditional participation).
If the simplistic allocation system based on stock prices is rejected,
some other calculus is needed. But, as in the case of conditional
participations based on earnings, none comes to mind and none has
been suggested by the proponents of delayed participation. 4 5
Several other troublesome aspects of both an earnings and a stock
price model of conditional participation should not go unnoticed. It
would be undesirable to permit unlimited transferability of the contingent rights, because of the high potential for deception; 46 yet it
would be harsh to prohibit all transfers. Limited transferability is a possibility, but policing the rules would require considerable administrative effort. Parallel problems arise concerning matters within the reorganized corporation. During the contingency period, should the firm be
permitted to increase its outstanding debt or recapitalize or merge with
another firm? What antidilution provisions should be required? Rules
would obviously be needed to free the hands of those who run the
corporation and to safeguard the position of those holding contingent
rights. Striking a sound balance is not easy.
There is a further difficulty, which is the mirror image of the problem
of placing a value on the contingent rights. Any contingency not hopelessly remote is likely to adversely affect the market prices of the
securities issued unconditionally under the plan; indeed, the possibility
of dilution will have the same impact on market prices as warrants or
securities convertible into common shares, and will justifiably be subject to the same criticism. Contingent participation, moreover, probably
dampens investor acceptance of any securities newly offered by the reorganized company during the contingency period, thus making it more
45 Someone -might be interested in thinking through the problems that could arise
if a reorganization plan had provisions for both a distribution to manager-owners and a
contingent distribution. It would be difficult to avoid unraveling complicated reciprocal
and interrelated adjustments.
46 See the discussion concerning long-term warrants at note 38 supra.
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difficult or costly for the reorganized company to finance future
47
growth.
One last argument in favor of contingent participation arrangements
remains to be examined. Given the imperatives of the absolute priority
doctrine and the uncertainties of valuation, junior classes frequently
resort, as previously noted, to a strategy of delay; the hope is that the
earnings picture for the enterprise will improve and set the stage for a
higher valuation-one that will enable them to stay in the enterprise
or increase their share of participation. If juniors were granted contingent participation rights, the argument runs, they would be less inclined to rely on the delay technique; hence, the reorganization process
would be expedited.
The possibility of such a trade off should not be summarily dismissed.
It would seem, however, that the case for contingent participation for
an otherwise excludable junior class on this ground is no different from
the case for nuisance claims. It might even give juniors a new reason
to delay the proceedings. Once contingent arrangements are authorized
by law, there is nothing to discburage a junior class from stalling so that
they can insist upon a larger contingent participation for themselves
after conditions for the enterprise have started to improve. The most
direct way to deal with a deliberate slowdown is to design measures to
defeat the strategy. That approach surely is more promising than a
change in substantive rules calculated to buy cooperation from those
most likely to gain from delay.
In the final analysis, all second chance or second look arrangements
in reorganization plans are directly at odds with a central element of
any senior investment contract that contains customary default provisions. These provisions are designed to terminate the ability of the
juniors to continue their "hold" on the capital contributed to the
enterprise by the seniors. A long contingency period, which gives the
enterprise a chance to recover, prevents the seniors from releasing this
"hold" until the period has come to a close.
A relevant comparison is afforded by mortgage moratoria legislation,
which allows the mortgagor additional time to cure a default before his
interest in the security is finally foreclosed. This legislation has generally been upheld as constitutional and considered fair when the
mortgagee receives the income from the property during the extension
period.48 In the corporate reorganization situation the old creditors,
who become the new stockholders, are generally unable to draw out
47
48

See Public Serv. Co., 26 S.E.C. 338 (1947).
See Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
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the earnings as dividends during the contingency period. Reinvestment
of earnings by the firm during that period may actually contribute to a
rise in earnings or share prices. If the old shareholders were to benefit
from reinvested earnings, they would, in effect, be pulling themselves
up by another's bootstraps. If the old juniors keep a hold on the capital
attributable to senior investment during the contingency period, to be
consistent the seniors should be entitled to interest on their old debt
securities throughout the period. It is manifestly unfair to deny them
both creditor status with respect to accrual of interest and full stockholder status because of the overhanging contingency to which their
equity position is subject.
It has long been recognized as improper to force the old seniors into
a "gap" position during a reorganization proceeding. An effective date
for transformation of rights from creditor to ownership status must be
part of the plan.49 Prior to the effective date the seniors are entitled,
with minor exceptions, to have their creditor claims increased by the
running of interest on their old securities. After that date they are entited to be treated as full fledged shareholders and to take the risks
and receive the full benefits normally associated with ownership.
VII
The starting point for a summary assessment of proposals to modify
the absolute priority doctrine is the proposition that the doctrine serves
primarily to (1) set limits on direct and indirect negotiations among
those who have invested in an enterprise, and (2) structure those
negotiations within a framework that facilitates judicial review of the
results. All proposals to alter the doctrine can be assessed in terms of
their potential impact on these functions.
Proposals to base the measurement of claims on the going concern
value of securities instead of on their liquidation priorities need not affect the process of valuing the enterprise, the pace of the reorganization
proceedings or the.reviewability of the reorganization plan. In a few
situations these proposals may favor senior classes who hold "premium"
grade securities (such as bonds carrying relatively high interest payments); but in most situations they would favor junior classes at the
expense of seniors. The major and decisive infirmity is that this change
would undermine a crucial aspect of the bargain embodied in the
senior securities: as corporate financial conditions worsened and the
49 The importance of the effective date in this respect is nicely illustrated by adjustments made to the plan of reorganization in the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Railroad Co. reorganization. See 254 I.C.C. 707 (1943).
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seniors were most in need of the default protection for which they had
bargained, the change would reduce the magnitude of their claims and
hence their participation in the reorganized enterprise.
Proposals to authorize judicial discretion to approve "good business
deals" or to recognize nuisance claims, so that reorganizations may be
expedited, would undercut the very essence of the absolute priority
doctrine. They would give junior classes playing cards they now lack
and to which they are not now entitled; no strong showing can be made
that bribing the juniors with a modicum of participation will keep
them from seeking more. In any event, the soundness of the business
deal and the fairness of the bribe are virtually immune from effective
judicial review. Only a version of the "unconscionable bargain" notion
could possibly serve as a backstop-and that notion has been notoriously ineffective in other areas of the law.
Proposals to allocate to the shareholder-manager group all or some of
the going concern value-meaning the excess of reorganization value
over liquidation value-could greatly expand the permissible limits of
negotiation. Old shareholders, especially those associated with operation of the enterprise, would be encouraged to dredge up a large
variety of benefits they arguably could confer on the firm. Moreover,
these "insiders" would often be in a position to raise issues about the
extent of their shareholdings and the value of their special contributions to the enterprise. It is not easy to visualize the precise stage in the
proceedings at which these matters would receive consideration. At the
outset of the reorganization it would frequently be difficult to know
enough about the role the owner-managers might play in the future of
the firm. Even if some special contribution on their part is recognized,
its treatment would seem to be dependent, at least in part, on the
participation (if any) accorded shareholders generally. Only after that
matter had been determined would it be feasible to decide how much
additional participation should be tied to the special contribution of the
"insiders." This last judgment would be particularly difficult to review
judicially unless the "extra" is regarded as payment for services to be
rendered-in which case it should be given to the recipients not as
shareholders but as employees or consultants to the firm.
Proposals to authorize contingent participations for junior classes
wholly or partially excluded from unconditional participation in the
reorganized enterprise would likewise expand the boundaries of permissible negotiations and further reduce the possibility of effective
control through judicial review. It seems most unlikely that a rational
system could be developed for determining the proper magnitudes for
contingent participations. In practice conditional participations would
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probably reflect rough compromises, producing results similar to arrangements that recognize the nuisance value of worthless junior
claims.
Taken together, these observations suggest that there is no persuasive
case for relaxing the doctrine under the existing structure of Chapter
X. The doctrine as it now stands and operates, however, would not be
fully compatible with a statutory change of the type proposed by the
Bankruptcy Commission, replacing Chapters X and XI with a single
framework for both corporate reorganizations and compositions. In
developing any such unified system, its effect upon the governing
standard of fairness would need to be carefully noted and handled.
Inadvertent destruction or erosion of the absolute priority doctrine
should not be permitted to occur under a procedure adopted for other
purposes.
A unified framework requires a basic choice in its design: a determination whether the strict priority doctrine or a composition standard
is to apply has to be made near the beginning of each reorganization;
or, in order to preserve a function for the strict priority rule, one or
more of the modifying proposals has to be adopted, even though doing
so may seriously weaken the doctrine. Under either alternative, it will
be important to focus upon the policies underpinning the strict priority
standard and consider how they will be affected by adoption of a unified
framework. The total impact of unification on strict priority should be
a major factor in determining whether the procedural advantages of
unification outweigh its substantive costs.

